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NOTE AND COMMENT
NEw TRIALS FOR TECHNICAL ERRORs.-A witness called to testify is pre-

sumed to be of good character. Hence no proof of it is necessary. But out
of abundant caution this presumption is fortified by evidence. The witness is thus shown to be in fact exactly what the law presumes him to be.
Result-the case is reversed for the commission of this grave and prejudicial
error.-Lockett v. State (Ark. 1918), 207 S. W. 55.
No one but an American lawyer could treat the above statement seriously.
Only an American court could announce so extraordinary a decision. In no
other English speaking country would the people tolerate such a perversion
of justice.
The case above cited was a remarkable one, in that it was first unanimously decided the other way. The court held that error in admitting. evidence
"to prove what the law would otherwise presume is harmless." This decision
was based on a prior decision to the same effect. Patrick v. State\ (Ark.
1918), 204 S. W. 852. But on a rehearing the court unaaiimously reversed
itself, and held that since the rule of -evidence here violated was declared by
statute, as was not the case in Patrick v. State, to refuse to hold the error
prejudicial and reversible would be to nullify the statute.
The argument as to the statute is supported by no authority, and it is
difficult to see how an error becomes any. more prejudicial merely because the
rule which is violated is found in the statute books instead of in the reports.
Statuteg often prohibit opinion evidence, but a reversal would hardly result
from a drop of opinion in a cumulative ocean of facts.
The .real cause of such a ruling as this is the medieval attitude of the American bar on matters of procedure. We think in terms of the age of Coke.
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We use candles because they were used in the Inns of Court, ignorant of
the fact that those Inns have blazed with electric lights for half a century.
Of the authorities relied on in the case under discussion, few are in point.
Many were cases where such evidence was. held to have been rightly excluded. Others were cases where other errors obviously prejudicial accompanied the erroneous admission of evidence, resulting in a reversal. State v.
Owens, IO9 Iowa i, cited in the opinion, and Brann.v. Campbell, 86 Ind. S16
and Bank v. Blakeman, i9 Okla. io6, cited in a text book which the opinion
cites, seem to be the only authorities supporting the decision of the Arkansas
court, and even these had already been discredited by Patrick v. Stat',
(s'upra), because they did not involve a statutory rule, and Patrick v. State
was'expressly reaffirmed as sound. On the other hand Green v. State (Tex.
Crim. Appeals), 12 S. W. 872, which was also cited in the same text book
denounced the doctrine of reversible error in such cases. It clearly was not
the force of authority but the iftstinct for technicality that brought about this
decision. It is only an example of a tendency which manifests itself in a
thousand ways.
The comfortable indifference of former times has been rudely shaken by
the social renaissance ushered in by the great war, and nowhere will reform
be more imperatively demanded than in judical administration. There can
be no doubt that we are at least a generation behind Great Britain in our
legal methods.
Fifteen years ago Mr. Wigmore sounded a warning, which apparently has
not yet been generally heeded. Speaking of the American doctrine of
granting new trials for error in applying the rules of evidence, he said:
"The whole doctrine, no doubt, has its deepest roots in the inveterate and
unconscious professional instinct, which grows to venerate unduly the rules
that form its daily mental pabulum. Whether in civil or criminal cases, it
has done more than any other one rule of law to increase the delay and expense of litigation, to encourage defiant criminality and oppression, and to
foster the spirit of litigious gambling. Added to this is the indirect result
produced upon the ever-lurking animal instinct of gregarious human brutality, which takes the failures of criminal justice as its pretext and sates itself
with cruel lynchings. * * * Some of the instances of its enforcement would
seem incredible even in the justice of a tribe of African fetish-worshippers.
* * * We shall some day awake to be convinced that a system of necessary
rules of evidence can exist and be nbeyed, without affixing indiscriminately to
every contravention of them the monstrous penalty of a new trial." x Wigmore on Evidence §21. We can only hope that the next fifteen years will
show more progress in making procedure the servant of justice than the last
E. R. S.
fifteen have shown.
DAMAGES FOR FRIGHT AND THE PROOF OF PROXIMATE CAUSE.-If

a recent

case in the Iowa court infra is compared with a line of decisions in the
equity courts in which nuisances productive of fear have been abated, some
light may be thrown on the obscure interlacing of the two doctrines suggested by the caption of this note. In Holdorf v. Holdori, (Iowa, 1918), 169
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N. W. 737, the plaintiff testified at the trial that the defendant "came up toward me, and he did as if he was to strike me." He did not touch her, but
she later suffered a miscarriage accompanied by severe pains and lacerations.
Held, she -may recover in an action of assault for resulting injuries-the act
of the defendant being willful. This is the stock situation of recovery-given
where there is fright without physical impact but resulting in physical injury
and might have been settled on the precedent of Green v. Shoemaker and Co.,
iii Md. 69, 8 MIcH. LAw Rrv. 44; but the court prefers to lay stress on its
own precedent of Watsoni v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, in which the willfulness of
the tort is the foundation for the recovery rather than any trespass to the
person proved by physical results.
One of the best of the extra-judicial discussions of this oft-litigated question is the article by Professor Bohlen in 41 AMma. LAW REG. 141 on the
"Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact,"
which appeared sh'6rtly after the decision in Dulien v.. White, (19oI), 2 K. B.
669, and approvds of the doctrine there laid down. He has concluded that
fright may be a link in the chain of causation leading to actionable physical
injury but that fright or mental suffering alone was not legal damage at
common law. "Material, tangible injury had to be shown before a recovery
could be had in an action for negligence." See also the excellent note in
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49.
It is submitted that this doctrine though technically correct and often
asserted in judicial utterances is doubtful in experience and surely not followed by the courts as a matter of fact. The common law has from an
early day given a recovery for mental suffering where the proximate cause
was clear, although the courts have veiled their real intent by branding these
cases as exceptions or by saying that the recovery was really for something
else. The action of assault where there is no physical impact recognizes a
recovery for fright although only nominal damages are given. Beach v.
Hancock, 27 N. H. 223. The trespass to the person here is nothing more
than an apprehension of bodily injury, and where the fright was serious,
substantial damages were recoverable. Small v. Lonergan, 8r Kan. 48, 25 L.
R. A. (N. S.), 976. Even though courts have insisted on accompanying
physical impact they have not required it in tort actions where the wrong
was willful-on ther theory, it seems, that aggravated- compensatory damages
were warranted in such cases. Craker v. Ry. (1875), 36 Wis. 657; Spade v.
Lynn, (i897), 168 Mass. 285, a much quoted dictum. This is in effect giving
a recovery for mental suffering alone under a clear cut exception. In the action for breach of contract of marriage, in which the feelings are manifestly
the subject matter of the contract, the recovery -for mental suffering is undisputed. Though called an exception it is more correctly a situation where
the courts are convinced that the suffering is undoubtedly a proximate consequence of the breach. It was suggested in 8 Micii. LAW REv. 44. cf. Wyard
v. West Jersey Ry., 65 N. J. L. 385-that the chief trouble of the courts,
which has caused the bewildering contrariety of decisions, was largely a
difficulty of proof of the proximate relation between the wrongful act alleged
and the result complained of: The courts start with the proposition that there
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is no recovery for mental suffering at common law, and when they begin
to depart from this pronouncement, because of the social demand that manifest wrongs shall be redressed, they hold'on to some well recognized cause
of action at common law to which the recovery for mental suffering may be
added. in other words they deny a recovery and allow it in the same breath
where the demand for a recovery is imperative.
There are, indeed, numerous situations where a direct recovery is actually
given through such indirect means. In the action of seduction the-chief element of damage is mental suffering in the form of humiliation and parental
anxiety and yet recovery has been based on the fiction of loss of service where
that service was no more than serving a cup of tea. tdezdrick v. McCrary,
(1852), 1I Ga. 603 and the case therein cited. Here, too, as in the breach of
contract of marriage, it is undeniable that the gist bf the action, mental suffering, is the proximate consequence of the breach. Most of the jurisdictions
have allowed a recovery where the fright has followed a violation of one of
the constitutional rights of life, liberty, or property-such violation giving
a right to an independent cause of action. Where the courts were convinced
that a serious injury traceable to a certain cause or class of causes had in
fact been occasioned by the mental suffering inflicted, they contrived a recovery by relying on or straining some recognized legal right or concocting some
new right, the violation of which could be regarded as the proximate cause of
the suffering; the damages for the suffering could thus be added into the
verdict. The purpose, it would appear, was to allow recovery and at the same
time to limit it to certain specified cases so as to shut out the possibility of fraudulent claims. In Lcsch v. Ry., 97 Minn. 5o3, the agents of the defendant while
committing a trespass on the premises of plaintiff's husband, frightened the
plaintiff. The court allowed her a recovery for the fright because it was accompanied by a willful invasion of her homestead; and created, it would seem, Or
new action to suit the case-'trespassquare homesteadium fregit.' Compensation was likewise allowed for the mental suffering endured consequent on the
mutilation of the body of the plaintiff's diceased husband. Recovery was
founded on the willful invasion of-the plaintiff's right to the disposition of her
husband's body-a right which is, to say the least, a much disputed one. The
court realized that the usual difficulty of ascertaining the cause was absent
in such a case. MITCHELL J. said: "That mental suffering and injury to the
feelings would be ordinarily the natural and proximate result of knowledge
that the remains of a deceased husband had been mutilated, is too plain to
admit of argument.' Nevertheless the court preferred to say that the violation of the right was thetproximate cause of the suffering rather than the act
of mutilation itself. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn, 307. Similarly the court in
the principal case needlessly introduced the element of willfulness as a reason
for recovery. Then there are the troublesome telegraph cases, in which the
plaintiff endures sorrow because unable to attend a funeral of a near or
dear relative, through the neglect of the company to deliver or transmit
promptly a telegram announcing the death. Mentzer v. W. U Tel. Co., 93
Ia. 752. The courts have struggled hard to find a legal hook in these cases.
They have given the sendee a right ex contracth as a third party beneficiary
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to a contract by the terms of which the company is warned that suffering
will follow a breach; and a right ex delictu has been found based on the
company's public duty. But it should be noted that as the relatives are more
distant from the plaintiff the courts are less inclined to rely on their creative
faculties. Thus, where the plaintiff's sorrow was caused by reason of inability
to attend his mother-in-law's funeral, recovery was denied, although the court
did not admittedly base its opinion on the popular conception of this hypenated relationship. The case is of value as pointing out that the courts as a fact
always look to see if there is a proximate cause before the legal hooks are
used to help out the situation. Rowell v. W. U. Tel. Co., 75 Tex. 26. The
contrary view is comprehensively expressed in W. U. Tel. Co. v. Chotcau,
28 Okla. 664.
An examination of a few of the illogical conclusions reached by the courts
will point out what the courts have come to in trying to put artificial restrictions on this inevitable demand for recovery. In Victorian Ry. v. Coultas,
L. R. 13 App. Cases, 222, the court refused to allow recovery for fright with
physical result because there was no physical impact; i. e., the direct trespass
to the person by the wrongful act was held to be a necessary hook to which
the recovery for fright might be attached. In Dulieu v. White (supra), the
court, disapproving of the Victorian Ry. case, held that the physical result
was sufficient for the purpose though there was no physical impact. In
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., isi N. Y. io7, the court insisted that the previous
impact was necessary and, by what seems to be a logical fallacy, concluded
that physical result could under no circumstances be a legal consequence of
fright or be used as a hook to which to tie recovery. The court starts with the
basic assumption that there is no recovery for fright at common law therefore, "it is difficult to understand how a defendant would be liable for its
consequences." The argument is: fright as a cause of action is zero, but
ex nihilo nihil fit (Cf. LUcR~rIus, DE Rraum NATURAX, 150,. 205), zero can
only produce zero, therefore the consequences of fright are zero, Q. E. D.
This, too, even when the consequences have been plainly proved in court.
Dulieu v. White fortunately disclosed the incorrectness of such a conclusion
and specifically rebutted the Mitchell. case which had been urged by counsel.
The principal case, in disregard of Dulieu v. White, fell victim to this logic.
The action was for damages for the consequences of fright and there is
nothing in the case to show that the plaintiff was asking for a recovery for the
fright causing the miscarriage. Yet the court went to the trouble of finding out
first that fright caused by a willful act was recoverable. If right justified i'ecovery so did its consequences, and the objection of the Mitchell case could not
hold. But wduld it not have been more correct for the court to have said simply that fright can be a link in the chain of causation. Indeed, Bohlen explained Wilkinson v. Downton not on the theory of willfulness but on the principle
that "the defendant intended to create a fright so severe as to be obviously
calculated to cause serious physical results." Here again it is evident
that the trouble has been caused by the failure to take a proper attitude on
the question of proximate cause.
The law courts have a lesson to learn from the common sense attitude of
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the American equity courts which have enjoined the erection of hospitals
as nuisances because of the consequent fear of contagion produced in the
minds of the residents, whose comfortable enjoyment of the premises was
thus curtailed. And though the fear was only a subjective one, wholly unwarranted by science, the courts have not withheld the injunction. In
Everett v. Paschall, 6I Wash. 47, where the complainants said they feared
infection from a tuberculosis hospital, the court said: "The question is
not whether the fear is founded in science, but whether it exists; not whether
it is imaginary, but whether it is real, in that it affects the movements and the
conduct of men. Such fears are actual 'and must be recognized by the courts
as other emotions of the human mind." To prove the actuality of the fear
the court cited the treatises cf pscychologists. The case does not stand alone
but is supported by a group of American decisions cited therein. The English
courts, however, have followed a decision of Lord Hard wicke in 3 Atk. 750,
that "the fears of mankind, though they may be reasonable ones,. will not
create a nuisance." This is repudiated by the Washington court. Though
there is no question of damages in the injunction cases, they are pertinent in
our inquiry since they show that the court took mental disturbance into ac-'
count as an element of legal injury where the proximate cause was clear'
and the injury was undoubted.
Just so soon as the courts drop their theorizing about the exister.ce or
non-existence of a right to recover at common law for mental suffering and
look at the problem in the light of the actuality of the cause and the consequence, then all trouble arising from arbitrariness and needless pursuit of
fiction will be obviated. At one time there was even doubt whether damages
for mental suffering were recoverable 'even though accompanied by physical
impact. But as soon as the courts realized that the suffering actually existed
they began to allow recovery-as Lord Wensleydale said in Lynch v. Knight,
9 H. L. Cas. 577: "where a material damage occurs and is connected with
it, it is impossible a jury in estimating it should altogether overlook the
feelings of the party interested." In Merill v. Los Angeles Gas Co. etc., 158
Cal. 499, 513, the court allowed recovery for mental worry caused by disfigurement of the plaintiff's face so as to make him feel that he would be a
source of ridicule to his fellows. The court said: "The whole matter possesses more academic than practical significance. * * * At the suggestion
of defendant's counsel, the jury is instructed to disregard all elements of
mental suffering except that arising solely from physical pain. Can the jury
do it? Will the jury do it? It is mere self-stultification to believe that it
will do other than to make up its verdict under the rule, which while not one
of law, is one of well nigh universal conduct,-the rule of 'Put yourself in
his place.'" However, it has been indicated that the proximate cause is equally evident and with equal force a fact before the mind of the jury where
there is no accompanying physical impact. In such cases the courts have
actually allowed a recovery although the true nature of the action was hidden behind a recovery for something else. In .Massachusetts there must be
physical impact but in Driscoll v. Gaffey, 2o7 Mlass. 102, there vas no more
than a scintilla of evidence of injury from without. This case was forcefully
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criticized by the court in Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 482; "the
rule of non-liability which is claimed to exist in such a case does not involve
the denial of the right to be compensated in damages for an injury caused by
fright, but merely has the effect of making the right to recover such damages
dependent upon the existence of a feature of wrongful occurrence which
confessedly may be quite trivial and amount to no more than a merely technical breach of duty, resulting in no appreciable harm to him, besides being in
itself a thing the existence of which may often be shown by evidence even
more readily fabricated and less easy to refute than -that in reference to the
injury attributable to mental fright.or shock." The same criticism would apply against the case which said that "dust in the eyes" would be sufficient
physical impact. Porter v. Lackawanna Ry., 73 N. J. L. 405. In a word, have
not the courts actually allowed recovery for fright in the cases of nominal
physical impact and the cases of willful or intefitional fright? The courts
have admitted that "wounding a man's feelings is as much actual damage
as breaking his limbs." Head v. Ga. Pac. Ry., 79 Ga. 358; and that "it would
be a reproach to the law if physical injuries might be recovered for, and not
those incorporeal injuries which would cause much greater suffering and
humiliation." Douglas v. Stakes, 149 Ky. 506, 509. Since, as the court says
in Spearmag-v. McCrary (sutra), "we know of no legal reason for denying that any agency is the prodmate cause of -a given result when it is as a
matter of fact," then why not throw aside fictions and regard mental suffering
standing alone as a legal wrong on which an action for damages may be
based. But see St. Louis Etc. Ry., v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42.
A. J. L.

IMPLIED CONDITION INVOLVING IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANce.-Early in
1914 the defendants contracted to sell to the plaintiffs a quantity of Finland

birch timber. The practice was to send the timber direct by sea from Finnish
ports. Before any timber was delivered the war broke out and the presence

of German warships in the Baltic made the direct shipment by water impossible. The contract contained no war, force majeure or -suspension provision. Held, that the contract was not dissolved, and the defendants were
liable for damages for non-delivery of the timber. Blackburn Robbin Co.,
Lim. v. Allen & Sons, Lim. (1918) 87 L. J. K. B. io85.
The doctrine of implied conditions has been brought before the English
courts more prominently since the outbreak of the war thdn ever before, by
reason of the many causes of impossibility of performance produced by the
war. On the whole it is clear that the courts of England have not allowed
themselves to be drawn away from established rules in spite of the great
pressure of the war emergency, thus exhibiting in a striking way the judicial
poise which has always been characteristic of British judges.
The leading recent case was Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K. B. 740, which
held that a contract for hiring a flat on Pall Mall for the two days on which
it was announced that the coronation procession would pass alonig Pall Mall.
was subject to the'implied condition that the procession should take place,
though nothing was said about it in the contract. The language of that case
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was rather broad, basing the dissolution of the contract on impossibility of
performance due to the "non-existence of the state of things assumed by
both contracting parties as the foundation of the contract," whether this state
of things was mentioned in the contract or not. The cases arising out of
the war have not tended to enlarge that language. In Horlock v. Beal [1916]
i A. C. 486, the House of Lords applied the rule to the case of a seaman's
contract of service, where the ship and crew were interned in a German port,
and held that the contract was dissolved. In P. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v.
Anglo-Mexican Peteoleum Products Co. [19x6] 2 A. C. 397, it was held that
he requisition of a ship by the government for war purposes did not put an
end to a five years' contract for the use of the ship, though LoRDs HALDANj
and ATKINSON dissented and LoRi LoRaEuRN said he would be of i different
opinion if it were established (as events doubtless did establish) that the
ship would be used by the government for substantially the remainder of the
five years, for in such an event the contracting parties would have been so
placed "that as sensible men they would have said, 'if that happens, of course
it is ,11over between us.'" In Shipton, Anderson & Co. v. Harrison Brothers
& Co. [1915] 3 K. B. 676, a contract for the'sale of specific wheat was held
to be dissolved by implied condition when the wheat was requisitioned by the
government. In Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co. (,918) 87
L. J. K. B. 370, a contract for the construction of certain reservoirs was
stopped and the plant and materials sold by order of the Minister of Munitions, and it was held by the House of Lords, on very full consideration, that
the impossibility of performance created by law excused the contractor from
performance.
In the principal case the court was unable to say that the continuance of
the normal mode of shipping timber from Finland was a matter which both
parties contemplated as necessary for the fulfillment of the contract. The
buyers were not interested in the means or the route by which the sellers
should make delivery, and it appeared that they were in fact unaware how
the timber was to be shipped or whether it might not be already held in stock
in England. The rule was doubtless properly applied. It is a rule which
must be applied with caution, for "if it be extended too far," as said by
tend to sap
McCARDIE, J., in giving judgment in the court below, "it-may
E. R. S.
the foundations of contract law as they now exist."
in
DEEDS To TAKE EFECT UPON DEATH ov GRANToR.-That instruments
form of wills may be effective as deeds of conveyance is clear. If a present'
interest is passed and execution is complete (which includes delivery), the
instrument must take effect as a deed. On the other' hand, if no interest is
to vest until or after death of the maker and there has been no complete
execution as a deed, the instrument, if operative at all, must take effect as a
will. Difficulties arise when there is a fully executed deed, which, however,
is to be postponed in its complete operation until the death of the grantor.
Where the grantor delivers the deed to a third party to be handed by him
to the grantee on the grantor's death there is substantial agreement among

44
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the courts that such instrument is not ineffective as an attempted testamentary
disposition. The cases of Felt v. Felt, I55 Mich. 237; and O'Brien v. O'Brien,
ig N. D. 713, cited by Professor Tiffany in I4 CoL. L. REv. 404, as holding
the other way are explained on the ground that there had been no delivery
of the deeds. The chief differences of opinion- in this class of cases has beLn
as to the time when and the extent to which such deeds divest the grantor
of ownership. See i6 MvICH. LAw REv. 586, where the matter is discussed.
The real difficulty arises when the grantor inserts into the deed a provision
in substance that "this deed shall t,-ke effect upon the death of the grantor."
In a number of cases it has been held that such provision makes the deed an
attempted testamentary disposition and as such void for lack of proper
execution. Turner v. Scott, 5I Pa. 126; Sperber v. Balster, 66 Ga. 317 (Cf.
White v. Hopkins, 8o Ga. I54) ; Pinkham v. Pinkhan, 55 Neb. 729; Bigley v.
Souvey, .45 Mich. 370; Shaull v. Slzaull, (Iowa) 16o N. W. 36. The leading
American case appears to be Turne;- v. Scott, supra, which -seems to depend
not a little upon the slender foundation of Habergham v. Vincent, 2 Ves.
Jr. 204.

In quite a number of jurisdictions deeds with provisions postponing complete operation until the grantor's death have been upheld as deeds of conveyance. Abney v. Moore, lo6 Ala. i31; Bunch v. Nicks, 5o Ark. 367; Latimer
V. Latimer, 174 Ill. 418; Kelly v. Shimer, 152 Ind. 290; Abbott v. Holway. 72
Me. 298; Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 251. There is no common ground on
which these cases proceed. Perhaps the general view is that the deed operates
as a conveyance in praesenti, with a life estate reserved somehow to -the
grantor. The bold attitude of the Maine court as displayed in Abbott v.
Holway, supra, is refreshing. The provision in the deed there in question
was: "This deed is not to take effect and operate as a conveyance until my
decease." In an action of waste against the grantor's representative for
cutting trees after the delivery of the deed the court held that the deed might
operate "as the parties intended, and carry an estate to commence in futuro
without the necessity of resorting to any subterfuges under which the estate
thus created to commence in futuro, may be regarded as existing only by way
of remainder or by virtue of some undisputed covenant to stand seized."
Why should not a deed be operative to convey an estate in fee simple or
any other estate upon the death of the grantor, just as well as to create such
an estate the first of next July? Of course no strings can be kept on such
deed, it must be beyond the legal (as distinguished from the physical) power
and control of the maker, in other words, it must have been delivered. Any
such reservation would either negative delivery, and there would be no
deed at all, or the instrument would be ambulatory, a quality attached to
testamentary dispositions. To be sure, under the common law conveyances
it Nas definitely established that estates of freehold could not be created to
commence in futuro. "It has long been settled that, according to the common law, a limitation of an estate of freehold to commence in futuro is void."
Savill v. Bethell, [1902] 2 Ch. 523, 540, citing Buckler's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 55a;
Barwick's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b; Roe v. Tranmer, Willes 682, 2 Wils. 75.
It was, however, possible to create uses, no -matter how large the estate there-
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in, in futuro, and when the Statute of Uses made the modes of creating ues
effective as conveyances there was available a ready means of accomplishing
what under common law modes of conveyancing had been impossible. Sazill
v. Bethell, supra; Murray v. Kerney, 115 Md. 514. The transaction giving
rise to the future use of course had to be complete. If, for instance, the use
was to arise out of a covenant to stand seized it is obvious that the covenant
must have been sealed and delivered, in other words, it must have appeared
that there was a completed legal act. And all such necessary steps must
have been taken in the lifetime of the covenantor; if it should appear that it
was his intention that no legal act should be consummated until after his
death, obviously the whole transaction would fail.
Almost all deeds of conveyance take effect or can take effect under the
Statute of Uses, and-ordinarily courts show the greatest liberality in upholding deeds in order to accomplish what the parties intended, whatever may
be the form. Thus in Roe v. Traniner, supra, a deed in form a common law
release was upheld as a covenant to stand seized; in Havens v. Sea Shore
Land Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 365, a deed with the words "remise, release, and quit
claim" was given effect as a bargain and sale; in Murray v. Kerney, supra,
an instrument that looked like an attempted will was upheld as a covenant
to stand seised. Independently of the Statute of Uses a deed may effect the
creation of a freehold in futuro, the statute of the state wherein lies the land
being construed as making such result possible. The Maine statute provides
that "a person owning real estate and having a right of entry into it, whether
seised of it or not, may convey it, or all his interest in it, by a deed," etc. It
was under this statute that Abbott v. Howay, supra, was decided. See also
Wilson v. Carrico, i4o Ind. 533; Ferguson v. Mason, 6o Wis. 377; Millcr v.
Miller, 91 Kans. I.
Any dispositive instrument to be fully operative only on the maker's death
certainly bears one of the ear-marks of a will. In view of the foregoing,
however, it seems clear that such fact cannot in itself be controlling. Where
the circumstances disclose a completed legal act so far as the maker is concerned, with no express or implied power of revocation, such instrument
would seem prima facie to be no testamentary disposition and the fact that
complete operation is postponed until death should not be a sufficient circumstance to give the instrument an ambulatory character, a necessary quality of
wills, ex hypothesi the instrument is complete and final as far as the maker
is concerned and therefore cannot be ambulatory. When a court says, as
did the Illinois court in O'Brien v. O'Bricn, 121 N. E. 243, that "To constitute
delivery it must clearly appear that it was the grantor's intention that the deed
should pass title at the time and that he should loge control over the same,"
an element that has no place in delivery is made an essential part thereof.
"A will is an instrument by which a person makes a disposition of his
property to take effect after his decease and which is in its own nature

ambulatory and revocable during his life."

JARMAN ON WILLS,

(6th ed.)

27.

Relatively slight circumstances added to the postponement of full operation
until death may be sufficient to show a testamentary interest, in which case
the instrument would of course be revocable despite apparent delivery. See
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Thorold v. Thorold, I Phil. I; Fielding v. Walshaw, 27 W. R. 492; Ison V.
Halcomb, 136 Ky. 523. In Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare Ch. 67, Vice-Chancellor.
Wigram said: "The third question is whether the plaintiff is precluded from
relief in this court, on the ground suggested, that this is a testamentary
paper * * * I have read the cases cited as to the instrument being testamentary * * * I certainly was not prepared to find that the cases had
gone so far as they have upon ihe subject. Those cases, however, are very
distinguishable from the one before me. This is not a case where there is
a general power of revocati6n reserved-a general power to dispose by will
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument. In the cases referred to
there has been a general revocation-or something like a revocation-of the
party's right to deal with the property, notwithstanding the instrument; and
the courts- have held, that in -such cases the instrument being one which
was not to have effect until the death of the party-or rather, I would .say,
to use the language of Sir John Nicholl in one of the cases in which, until
the death of the party, the instrument itself was not consummated-until
then no conclusive effect could be given to it. If that does not occur, the
R. W. A.
instrument is not to be considered as testamentary."
TERMINATION OF A CONTINUING GUARANTY.-Several persons jointly and
severally guaranteed to.a bank the present and future obligations of a customer, stipulating that "the bank may grant extensions without lessening the
liability" of the guarantors, that "this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall
cover -all the liabilities which the customer may incur or come under until
the undersigned, or the executors or administrators of the undersigned, shall
have given the bank notice in writing to make no further advances on the
security of this guaranty," and that "this guaranty shall not be affected by the
death of the undersigned." One of the guarantors died and his executor
wrote a letter "revoking the guaranty." Thereafter, the bank took renewals
of the obligations then current and made fresh advances. What are the
rights of the bank against the surviving guarantors and the executor of the
deceased?
This question was presented to the Supreme Court of Alberta in Northern
Crown Bank v. Woodcrafts Ltd. et al., ii Alberta L. R. I. It was held that
the executor's notice terniinated the guaranty as to him, so that he was not
liable for the fresh advances afterward made, but that, by reason of the
provision authorizing extensions, he was not discharged, in respect of advances already made, by the -renewals subsequently taken; and it was held
that the notice in no way affected the liability of the surviving guarantors.
No authority was cited except upon the last point. The executor and the.
surviving guarantors appealed to the Privy Council, whose judgment is
reported under the name of Egbert v. National Crown Bank, [i918] A. C.
903. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, but the opinion, by
Lord Dunedin, squarely places the 'lecision upon the ground that by the
terms of the guaranty it was to remain in full force as to all of the guarantors
"until there is noice given by each and all of the guarantors, the executors
of any deceased co-signatory coming in his place." No authorities were cited.

NOTE AND COMMENT
So far as concerns the liability of the surviving guarantors, the decision
is clearly right. The Privy Council's position, which is simply strict construction of the revocation clause, is unquestionably sound thus far, that this
clause does not reserve to each the power to revoke for all. Such reservation
might, of course, be made, but it can hardly be construed out of this or any
equally general stipulation, the interpretation naturally being confined to
giving to each that power which is necessary for his own protection. Neither
does the lower court's position, that the executor released himself, lead indirectly and through the general equities of suretyship to the release of the
others, for each has, by hypothesis, stipulated for just this sort of discharge
of his fellows. The case is clearly distinguishable from that of discharge of
a cosurety by act of the creditor. Beckett v. Addyman, 9 Q. B. D. 783.
The case of the executor, however, upon which the courts differed so
radically, is not equally clear. The Privy Council's construction of the
revocation clause, as requiring unanimous action, is extreme. The result is
harsh upon a guarantor who wishes to withdraw, but cannot secure the concurrence of all his brethren, and puts it in the power of. the principal to
collude with one guarantor against 'the rest. Again, it is objectionable to
hold the estate of a deceased surety indefinitely under a contingent liability
for future advances. Coulthart v. Clementson, 5 Q. B. D. 42; Gay v. Ward,
67 Conn. 147. We may assume that these considerations are not -of sufficient
weight to invalidate a specific provision in a guaranty requiring unanimousaction, but, when we have to construe a stipulation as general in its terms as
that before the court, we should resolve the doubt against the harsh and
impolitic interpreta tion. It is gubmitted that the Privy Council's position is
erroneous. It should be noted, however, that it cannot be relegated to the
limbo of obiter dicta, though it goes beyond the case presented on appeal,
for it supports the decision on the executor's liability for renewals, and is the
only thing in the opinion which does support that decision. It must also be
admitted 'that there is, apparently, no clear authority against it, though some
support for the lower court's release of the executor from the fresh advances
can be found. Coulthart v. Clementson, supra; Beckwith v. Addyman, supra;
Harris v. Fawcett, x5 Eq. 311, 8 Ch.. App. 866; Ashby v. Day, 54 L. T. 408;
Slagle v. Forney's Exr., 15 At. 427.
Assuming that the lower court was right in its construction of the guaranty
as reserving to the executor the power to terminate the guaranty as-to himself, so that lie was not liable for the fresh advances, a nice question remains
as to whether he should have been he)d liable for the prior advances subsequently renewed. This, too, resolves itself into a problem in construction.
It would seem that, as a general rule, the revocation'of a continuing guaranty,
whether by notice or by death, has the effect of destroying its continuing
character and converting it into a simple guaranty *ofthe 'then obligations of
the principal. From this it follows that a subsequent renewal of these obligations constitutes an extension of time, with the usual result. Gay v. Ward,
supra; National Eagle Bank v. Hunt, i6 R. I. 148. Compare Williams v.
Reynolds, jI La. 230: Wise v. Miller, 45 Oh. St. 388. In our case, however,
extensions were explicitly authorized by the guaranty and, if-this authoriza-
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tion survived the notice of revocation, the renewals are, of course, binding.
We may assume-that such an authorization might by explicit stipulation be
made perpetual, though this would be open to some objections on the score
of policy. Assuming this, the question comes to one of construction of the
-two clauses, the one authorizing extensions, the other reserving a power
of revocation. Does the latter overreach the former, -or does , it not? The
phraseology of this particular instrument is not significant, and there is little
or nothing to vary the question as to how, in general, clauses of this type
should be construed. One would like to limit the over-technical doctrine of
discharge by extension of time, denying its application in any case from
which it can be fairly excluded, as it can here by liberal interpretation of the
extension clause. And one can argue that, in a continuing guaranty, such
an extension clause is mere surplusage if it applies only to extensions preceeding revocation. On the other hand, it may be said that the fault with
the rule on discharge by extension is simply that it is too rigid, and that the
remedy is not to arbitrarily exclude it from any case but to reform it by
requiring negligence or bad faith on the part of the creditor and injury to the
surety; but that here the stipulations either authorize all extensions or, being
revoked, authorize none. It may be argued that, if this extension clause is not
revocable by each upon notice, it is not revocable at all, for the revocation
clause does not contemplate more than one kind of revocation; but, if the
extension clause is irrevocable, this constitutes an unwholesome state of
affairs. It is harsh upon the guarantors. It is objectionable in its effect upon
the administration of the estates of deceased guarantors. It puts it in the
power of the principal and creditor to make the guaranty a permanent foundation of credit over which, at the expense of the sureties, current business
might be conducted indefinitely. The authorities upon this problem are as
nicely balanced as the arguments. The decision of the Supreme Court of
Alberta in our case, systaining the extension clause, cannot be said to have
been reversed by the Privy Council, for the latter simply carried farther the
strict construction of the revocation clause. On the other hand, in a case
practically identical with ours, though involving implied power of revocation
by death and notice, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the
extension clause was revoked. National Eagle Bank v. Hunt, supra.
Possibly there is intermediate ground between these positions. We might
hold that power of revocation by notice was here waived, as to extensions, and
that power of revocation could be waived altogether, but that a perpetual
continuing guaranty, either for new advances or for extensions, is contrary
t9 public policy and cannot be tolerated, and that in cases where it is necessary, upon a bill filed for that purpose, a continuing guaranty can be wound
up and discharged by decree of court. We find no more direct authority for
such a proceeding than the familiar suits for exoneration, and, more remotely
related, the whole body of equitable interference in the suretyship relat;on.
E. N. D.
But is that not enough?

